The paper investigates how voting weights should be assigned to differently sized constituencies of an assembly. The one-person, one-vote principle is interpreted as calling for a priori equal indirect influence on decisions. The latter are elements of a one-dimen sional convex policy space and may result from strategic behavior consistent with the median voter theorem. Numerous artificial constituency configurations, the EU and the US are investigated by Monte-Carlo simulations. Penrose's square root rule, which originally applies to preferencefree dichotomous decision environments and holds only under very specific conditions, comes close to ensuring equal representation. It is thus more robust than previously su ggested.
Introduction
The principle of "one person, one vote" is generally taken to be a cornerstone of democracy. It is not clear, however, how this principle ought to be operationalized in practice either in terms of apportioning an integer number of seats for given non -integer 'ideal shares' (see Balinski and Young 2001) or in determining what are the ideal shares. This paper addresses the latter problem for two-tier voting systems that involve multiple constituencies of different population size. We concentrate on situations in which representatives of constituencies in the higher-level assembly vote as a block (as in the US Electoral College) or in which a single agent represents each constituency but is endowed with a number of votes that somehow reflect population size (as in the EU Council of Ministers). Both boil down to weighted voting.
Although it seems straightforward to allocate weights proportional to population sizes, this ignores the combinatorial properties of weighted voting, which often imply stark discrepancies between voting weight and actual voting power: In an assembly with simple majority rule and three representatives having weight 47, 43, and 10, all three possess exactly the same number of possibilities to form a winning coalition and hence the same a priori power. Moreover, direct proportionality disregards the possibly nonlinear relationship between population size and an individual's effect on the respective constituency's top -tier policy position.
The most well-known solution to this problem is the one first suggested by Penrose (1946) .
Starting from the ideal world in which only constituency membership 1 distinguishes voters, Penrose found that if members of any constituency are to have the same a priori chance to ind irectly determine the outcome of top -tier decisions, then constituencies' voting weights need to be such that their power at the top-tier as measured by the Penrose-Banzhaf index (Penrose 1946; Banzhaf 1965 ) is proportional to the square root of the respective constituency's population size (also see Felsenthal and Machover 1998, sect. 3.4) . This square root rule has recently become the benchmark for numerous studies of the EU Council of Ministers (see, e. g. Felsenthal and Machover 2001 , 2004 , Leech 2002 and it is at least a reference point for investig ations concerning the US (see e. g. Gelman, Katz and Bafumi 2004) .
Applying the square root rule has, unfortunately, two weaknesses: First, Penrose's theorem critically depends on equiprobable 'yes' and 'no'-decisions by all voters (or at least a 'yes '-1 We take the constituency configuration to be given exogenously. See, e. g., Epstein and O'Halloran (1999) on constructing majority-minority voting districts along ethnic, religious, or social lines. probability which is random and distributed independently across voters with mean exactly 0.5). If the 'yes'-probability is slightly lower or higher, or if it exhibits even minor dependence across voters -say, they are influenced by the same newspapers -then the square root rule may result in highly unequal representation (see Good and Mayer 1975 and Chamberlain and Roth schild 1981) . Related empirical studies in fact have failed to confirm the predictions for average closeness of two -party elections which lie behind the square root rule (see Tuerlinckx 2002 and Bafumi 2004) .
Second, rigorous justifications for using the square root rule as the benchmark have so far concerned only preference-free binary voting.
2 But real decisions are rarely binary, e. g., about
either introducing a tax, building a road, accepting a candidate, introducing affirmative action, etc. or not. At least at intermediate levels there is a preference-driven compromise that involves many alternative tax levels, road attributes, suitable candidates, degrees of affirmative action, etc.
The first criticism has been addressed in the literature, at least in abstract normative terms.
Namely, one can argue that constitutional design should to be carried out behind a thick veil of ignorance in which no particular type of dependence or modification of equiprobability (which follows from the principle of insufficient reason) is justified. Regarding the second issue, this paper is to our knowledge the first to investigate equal representation for non-binary decisions that possibly involve strategic behavior.
We consider policy alternatives from a one-dimensional convex space. 3 Our formal model (see Section 2) imposes two key assumptions: first, the policy advocated by the top-tier representative of any given constituency coincides with the ideal point of the respective constituency's median voter (or the constituency's core). Second, the decision taken at the top tier is the position of the pivotal representative (or the assembly's core), with pivotality determined by the weights assigned to constituencies and a 50% decision quota. The respective core is meant to capture the result of strategic interaction. As long as this is a reasonable approximation, the actual systems determining collective choices are undetermined and could even differ 2 For rigorous, very comprehensive treatments of the binary or simple-game world see Felsenthal and Machover (1998) or Taylor and Zwicker (1999) . -The former (pp. 72ff) also justify the square root rule regarding voting weights by its minimal expected majority deficit. Feix, Lepelley, Merlin, Rouet, and Vidu (2005) report related results for the probability of the referendum paradox.
3
One could alternatively consider aggregate decisions that divide a 'pie', e. g., the distribution of public expenditures. This has been pursued empirically, for example, by Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder (2002) and Horiuchi and Saito (2003) . across constituencies.
In the benchmark case of voters with independent most-preferred policies, a given individual's chance to be pivotal at the bottom tier is inversely proportional to the respective constituency's population size. This makes it necessary and sufficient for equal representation of voters that the probability of any given constituency being pivotal at the top tier is proportional to its size. 4 The population size of a constituency affects the distribution of its median. A given voter's chance to be doubly pivotal thus becomes a rather complex function of (the order statistics of) differently distributed independent random variables. This makes a neat analytical statement similar to Penrose's rule exceptionally hard and likely impossible, except for special limit situ ations. We therefore resort to Monte -Carlo simulation (see Section 3). Considering a vast number of randomly generated population configurations as well as recent data for the EU and the US, top-tier weights proportional to the square root of population turn out optimal for most practically relevant population configurations. Even for ext reme artificial cases, the rule yields good results and becomes optimal if the number of constituencies gets large.
Our surprising main finding is thus that the square root rule is a much more robust norm for egalitarian design of two-tier voting systems t han previous analysis suggests. In particular, it continues to apply in the presence of many finely graded policy alternatives and strategic interactions consistent with the median voter theorem. To the extent that this still produces ind ependent median vo ters, the rule is even robust to the introduction of preference dependence within or across constituencies.
Model
Consider a large population of voters partitioned into m constituencies C 1 , . . . , C m with n j = | C j | > 0 members each. Voters' preferences are single-peaked with ideal point λ j i (for i = 1, . . . , n j and j = 1, . . . , m) in a convex one-dimensional policy space normalized to X ≡ [0, 1]. Assume for simplicity that all n j are odd numbers.
For any random policy issue, let ⋅ : n j denote the permutation of voter numbers in constituency C j such that ).
In the top -tier assembly or electoral college E, each constituency C j has voting weight w j ≥ 0. Any subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , m} of representatives which achieves a combined weight ∑ j∈S w j above q ≡ ½ , is the unique policy that beats any alternative xX ∈ in a pairwise majority vote, i. e. constitutes the core of the voting game defined by weights and quota. 6 Without detailed equilibrium analysis of any decision procedure that may be applied in E (see Banks and Duggan 2000 for sophisticated non-cooperative support of policy outcomes inside or close to the core), we assume that the policy agreed by E is in the core, i. e. it equals the ideal point of the pivotal representative P:m.
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If voters' utility is linear in distance, the criterion also guarantees equal expected utility, i. e., a priori power and expected success are then perfectly aligned. See Laruelle, Martinez, and Valenciano (2006) for a conceptual discussion of the latter. 5 We are aware that this may not in all applied contexts be appropriate. -The possibility that two ideal points exactly coincide, in which case the median voter (in contrast to the median policy) is not well-defined, is ignored. This is innocuous for any continuous ideal point distribution. , is assumed. Then, the complement of a losing coalition need no longer be winning. In this case there may not exist any policy x ∈ X which beats all alternatives x' ≠ x despite unidimensionality of X and single-peakedness of preferences.
In this setting we consider the following egalitarian norm: Each voter in any constituency should have an equal chance to determine the policy implemented by the electoral college. Or, more formally, there should exist a constant c > 0 such that
We would like to answer the following question: which allocation of weights w 1 ,...,w m satisfies this norm (at least approximately) for an arbitrary given partition of an electorate into m constituencies? In other words we search for an analogue of Penrose's (1946) Given that voters' ideal points in constituency C j are i. i. d., each voter i ∈ C j has the same probability to be its median. Hence,
Using that the events {i = (n j +1)/2 : n j } and {j = P:m} are independent, one can thus write (1)
So if constituency C j is twice as large as constituency C k , representative j must have twice the chances to be pivotal than representative k in order to equalize individual voters' chances to be pivotal. This index equals a constituency's probability of being pivotal under equiprobable random 'yes'-or-'no' votes at the top tier. Conditions for when this is approximately the voting weight are given by Lindner and Machover (2004) . In general, implementing Penrose's square root rule requires numerical solution of the inverse problem of finding weights which induce a desired power distribution (see Leech 2003) .
ear rule based on the SSI as the replacement for Penrose's square root rule. In other words, w would have to be chosen such that φ j (w, q) is directly proportional to population size n j for all constituencies j = 1, . . . , m -a relatively simple task.
However, it is in our view more convincing in egalitarian analysis to assume i. i. So, the larger a constituency C j is, the more concentrated is the distribution of its median voter's ideal point, λ j , on the median of the underlying ideal point distribution (assumed to be identical for all λ j i ). This makes the representative of a larger constituency on average more central in the electoral college and more likely to be pivotal in it for a given weight allocation.
It is important to observe that the assumption of the respective collective preferences having an identical a priori distribution is inconsistent with the assumption that all individual preferences are a priori identically distributed. The i ntuitively appealing linear rule of giving twice the weight (or SSI voting power) to a constituency double the size violates the one-person, onevote principle if one makes the latter assumption. We find it considerably more fitting and will assume i. i. d. ideal points for all bottom-tier voters throughout this paper. Weights and SSI of constituencies hence need to be increasing in population size but less than linearly.
Probability Pr(j = P:m) in (2) depends both on the different distributions of representatives' ideal points (essentially the standard deviations σ j determined by constituency sizes n j ) and the voting weight assignment. This makes computation of the probability of a given constituency C j being pivotal a complex numerical task even for the most simple case of uniform weights, in which the representative of C j with median top -tier ideal point is always pivotal, i. e.
..,1,1,..., jjm ≡−+ as the index set of all constituencies except C j . Then, the probability of constituency C j being pivotal is ( 
where f j and F j denote the density and cumulative density functions of λ j (j = 1, . . . , m). It seems feasible (but is beyond the scope of this paper) to provide an asymptotic approximation for this probability as a function of constituency sizes n 1 , . . . , n m for special cases, e. g. for
However, we doubt the existence of a reasonable approximation for arbitrary configurations (n 1 , . . . , n m ). Proceeding to the case of weighted vo ting (P ≡ (m+1)/2), even success in more generally approximating
for any given realization p of random variable P would be of little help because events {P = p} and {j = p:m} are no longer independent. 8 So, typically,
Pr:PrPr:
A purely analytical investigation of the model is therefore unlikely to produce much insight.
The following section for this reason uses Monte-Carlo simulation in order to approximate the probability of any constituency C j being pivotal for gi ven partition of an electorate or config uration {C 1 , . . . , C m } and a fixed weight vector (w 1 , . . . , w m ). Based on this, we try to find weights (w 1 * , . . . , w m * ) which approximately satisfy the two equivalent equal representation conditions (1) and (2). 
Simulation results
The problem of finding probability π j ≡ Pr(j = P:m) is similar to that of evaluating the odds of rolling a "6" with a funny -shaped dice: while one may conceivably solve a complex dynamic model with several partial differential equations, it is equally reliable to simply roll the dice many times and keep track of "6"s. 
by the law of large numbers. The speed of convergence in s can be assessed by the sample variance of h 1 , . . . , h s . Using the central limit theorem, it is then possible to obtain estimates of π j with a desired precision (e. g. a 95%-confidence interval) if one generates and analyzes a sufficiently large number of realizations.
To obtain a realization h j l of H j , we first draw m random numbers λ The goal is to identify a simple rule for assigning voting weights to constituencies whichif it exists -approximately satisfies equal representation conditions (1) or (2) for various num-9
We use a Java computer program. The source code is available upon request. Directly drawing the constituency medians λ j provides a huge computational advantage. Unfortunately, it prevents statements about the population median and, e. g., its average distance to the policy outcome.
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The mentioned asymptotic results for order statistics imply that only F's median position and density at the median matter when constituency sizes are large. So below findings are not specific to the assumption of uniform distributions at the bottom tier. We have considered two different criteria in parallel for evaluating distance between the (estimated) probability vector p ≡ ( 1 p , . . . , 
Minimization of (6) seems to us more relevant than that of (5). In any case optimal values of α are virtually unaffected by a switch between the two criteria. They are also almost unaffected by a switch from respective quadratic deviations to absolute deviations. So, with little loss of information, we will only present results for measure (6), referring to it as cumulative individual quadratic deviation below. Section 3.1 first investigates computer-generated random env ironments with constituency numbers between 10 and 100; we investigate several population configurations for each m to check the robustness of an optimal α. Sections 3.2 and 3.3 then briefly look at the EU Council of Ministers and the US Electoral College. Results in Table 1 Constituency sizes seem usually a matter of history, geography, or deliberate design. In the latter case, one might expect them to be clustered around some 'ideal' intermediate level. This makes a (truncated) normal distribution around some value n a focal assumption for constituency configurations. Table 2 indicates that, in this case, α = 0.5 is no longer the general clear winner from the considered set of parameters {0, 0.1, . . . , 0.9, 1}. This is neither very surprising nor -from a square-root-rule point of view -very disturbing: Moderately many and more or less equally sized constituencies give rather little scope for discrimination between constituencies. Assigning slightly larger constituencies substantially more weight risks overshooting the mark, but assigning them only slightly more weight may not translate into an increased number of pivot positions at all. So, first, the optimal α can be expected to be rather sensitive to the precise constituency configuration at hand, especially when a small number of constituen-cies creates relatively few distinct opportunities to achieve a majority. And, second, in the wide range where extra weight to an above-the-average constituency translates into no or few extra winning coalitions, the objective function is very flat. This is nicely illustrated by Figure 1 . Parameter x provides a lower bound on n j and parameter κ determines how quickly the probability of drawing a large (rather than small or medium-sized) constituency approaches 0.
Randomly generated configurations
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Examples for which (approximative) power-law behavior has been observed include sizes of human settlements (Gabaix 1999 , Reed 2004 , the value of oil reserves in oil fields, the size of meteor impacts on the moon, or even frequencies of words in long sequences of text. Explanations for this widespread regularity are based on ideas such as self-organized criticality and highly optimized tolerance (see e. g. Newman 2000) . (1.08×10 -8 ) (3.61×10 -9 ) (1.03 ×10 -10 ) (2.85×10 -11 ) (1.91 ×10 -10 ) (7.54×10 -13 ) Table 3 reports simulations with constituency sizes drawn from a Pareto distribution with x = 0.1 and κ ∈ {1, 1.8, 3.4, 5}, where numbers refer to million inhabitants. As long as the distri-bution is only moderately skewed (small κ), findings correspond nicely to those for the uniform distribution: jj wn = performs best and gets close to ensuring equal representation provided that the number of constituencies is sufficiently large. The former is no longer the case for a heavily skewed distribution of constituency sizes, i. e. when there are mostly small constituencies and only one or perhaps two large constituencies (reminiscent of atomic players in an otherwise oceanic game). Giving all constituencies equal weight does reasonably well. A coefficient α greater, but still not far from zero, improves on this by creating additional pivot positions for the large constituency. But for a moderate number of constituencies, increasing α after the initial introduction of asymmetry produces quite little effect (again, the objective function is rather flat over a big range as indicated by Figure 2 ) and then suddenly overshoots, resulting in too much power for the large constituency. For the same combinatorial reasons as in the no rmal-distribution case, this problem gets less severe, the greater is the total number of constituencies: For m = 100 or larger, α = 0.5 turns out to be clearly optimal even for high skewness (κ = 5).
Number of constituencies
In summary, the above analysis of many different population configurations reveals three things. First, as Table 1 and Figures 1 and 2 show, α = 0.5 results in representation close to being as equal as possible for the given partition of the electorate. Second, for a moderately large number m of constituencies α ≈ 0.5 is optimal in the considered class of power laws unless all constituency sizes are very similar (e. g., n j normally distributed with small variance) or rather similar with one or two outliers (corresponding to a heavily skewed distribution).
Third, even in these extreme cases the optimal α converges to 0.5 as m gets large. We now turn to two prominent real-world two-tier voting systems.
EU Council of Ministers
Together with Commission and Parliament, the Council of Ministers is one of the European Union's chief legislative bodies. It is widely held to be the most influential amongst the three and most voting power analysis concentrates on it.
14 It consists of a national government repre-14 See Felsenthal and Machover (2004) , Baldwin and Widgren (2004) , and Leech (2002) for examples. Napel and Widgren (2006) argue formally that the Commission's and Parliament's positions are nearly irrelevant in the EU25 most common codecision procedure.
sentative from each of the EU member states, endowed with voting weight that is (weakly) increasing in share of total population. 15 Figure 3 illustrates the probabilities that representatives from differently sized member states are pivotal in the Council assuming a 50% decision quota and assigning voting weight based on populations size via w j = n j α .
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In line with above findings for randomly generated two-tier voting systems, α = 0.5 performs best amongst all coefficients in {0, 0.1, . . . , 1}. The figure shows how close the implied probability of country j being pivotal comes to the respective ideal value, which would implement a priori perfectly equal representation. Only the most populous country, Germany, would be visibly misrepresented (here: over-represented). The current voting rule is actually quite complex. In addition to standard weighted voting it involves the requirement that the majority weight supporting a policy represents a simple majority of member states and 62% of population. Note that this analysis not only puts historical voting patterns and preference similarities b etween some members behind a veil of ignorance but also, as do the mentioned applied studies, it disregards differences between the bottom-tier voting procedures which determine national governments. For example, the UK uses plurality rule or a "first-past-the-post" system, whilst
Germany uses a roughly proportional system. 17 This difference might have a systematic effect on the respective accuracy of our median voter assumption at the constituency level. To the extent that it does not, our findings are robust.
Investigation of a quota variation even for a very idealized Council illustrates that the decision threshold is not only affecting the balance of 'external costs' and 'decision-making costs' (Buchanan and Tullock 1962) or challenging the so -called 'efficiency' of a decision-making body (operationalized as the probability that a random proposal is passed in the classical 0-1 setting by Machover 2001 and Baldwin et al. 2001 amongst others) . The quota 17
Germany's system is actually complex: some members of parliament are directly elected in a first-past-thepost manner, others get seats in proportion to their party's vote. Stratmann and Baur (2002) use this distinction amongst German parliamentarians to show that different electoral procedures indeed translate into different policies.
also has important implications for equality of representation and hence the legitimacy of decisions. Decisions in the Electoral College have in the recent past been essentially binary. The pivotal player amongst the states' median voters might, however, feature prominently in a more sophisticated model of how the two main contestants are selected. In any case, consideration of strategic policy choices in a convex space provides a useful benchmark for the preference-free dichotomous model considered by Penrose (1946) and, specifically addressing the Electoral College, Banzhaf (1968) . 18 18 Early weighted voting analysis of US presidential elections also includes Brams (1978, ch. 3). 
US Electoral College
Concluding remarks
As highlighted, e. g., by Good and Mayer (1975) and Chamberlain and Rothschild (1981) , even slight changes regarding decision making at the individual or collective level can produce very different recommendations for operationalizing the one-person, one-vote principle, interpreted here as identical (and positive) indirect expected influence on final outcomes by all voters.
Apart from our 'veil of ignorance' perspective with a priori identical but independent voters, the setting considered in this paper is very remote from the preference-free binary model considered by Penrose (1946) , Banzhaf (1965 Banzhaf ( , 1968 In summary, the square root rule is a simple and trustworthy norm, not an artifact of a particular objective function or setting. This insight can hopefully increase its effect on constitutional design in the real world.
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We see several promising directions for future research. First, it is desirable to obtain an alytical results at least for some special cases. At a level unfortunately still hidden to us, the central limit theorem and approximate proportionality of square root of population and standard deviation of the respective median position seem to be the ultimate source of above observ ations.
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In fact, Penrose (1946) seems to have deliberately blurred the distinction between voting weight and voting power in his discussion of equal representation in a world assembly.
20
Also see for a related utilitarian investigation.
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The square root rule already played a significant role in the public discussion of a possible EU Constitution. See, for example, the open letter by Bilbao et al. (2004) to the EU members' governments with repercussions in various national news outlets.
Second, the effects of changing the top-tier decision quota deserve attention in particular in the context of the European Union. Our preliminary investigations indicate that optimality of α = 0.5 remains unaffected by small increases of the top-tier quota. Of course, even approx imately equal representation is impossible under unanimity rule (keeping the bottom -tier role of the median). In between, optimal assignments tend to give large constituencies greater weight than implied by α = 0.5.
Third, it is likely that also in our setting some combinatorial index of voting power, rather than voting weight, would be the best reference point for proportionality to square root of population. Standard indices (e. g., Penrose-Banzhaf or Shapley -Shubik index) can, however, be ruled out because they implicitly assume identical stochastic behavior of top-tier voters, from which a simple linear rule involving the Shapley -Shubik index would follow. There conceiv ably exist many other candidates. Finding a suitable index would be useful for small constituency numbers. Given the close-to -equal representation obtained above already for as few as 15 constituencies, this seems no priority though. 
